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1.  Introductory summary
Growth in energy consumption is not just a by-product of economic growth, 
it is a causal factor. Attempts to constrain energy consumption can therefore 
be expected to impede economic growth. Fossil-based energy has an economic 
advantage but gives rise to pollution concerns. But conventional air pollution 
is not a necessary by-product of power production and has been successfully 
decoupled from it in western countries through development of scrubbers and 
other end-of-pipe treatments. Indirect air contaminants, such as ozone and 
aerosols, are not trending upwards and peak level episodes have fallen, but 
the complexities of the atmospheric processes in these cases make progress 
inherently slower. Carbon dioxide is not controllable by conventional scrubbers, 
instead it is tied linearly to energy consumption. CO2 emission reductions will 
therefore be much more expensive to achieve under current technology. Eco-
nomic reasoning provides a few basic ideas for guiding energy and pollution 
policy. Regulations should be focused directly on the variable of interest, not 
on indirect market transactions. The principle of pricing states that the most 
efficient outcome of well-designed regulations will match that which would 
have resulted from using price instruments directly applied to the emissions of 
concern. The pricing principle helps explain why some interventions, like the 
subsidy-driven expansion of the renewables sector, are inefficient.
2. Energy as a Causal Factor
2.1  Engine of liberation
Electricity and the spread of household appliances results in increased conve-
nience, reduced indoor air pollution and gains in population health through 
better food handling and indoor climate control. The availability of inexpen-
sive electricity has truly been a miraculous source of economic growth, social 
progress and equality in the west. Greenwood et al. (2005) showed that, in 
American households, the proliferation of household appliances, made possible 
by the spread of electricity, reduced required average housework time from 58 
hours per week to 18 hours per week between 1900 and 1975. They found that 
adoption of durable goods in the home (major appliances like washing machines 
and stoves) accounted for over half the increase in female participation in the 
US labour force over the 20th century. A similar finding can also be expected 
6for other countries,, namely that increased productivity in the home leads to 
more time for participation in the paid workforce.
2.2  Cause or Effect?
When examining the link between energy consumption and growth we need 
to address the question of whether increased energy consumption causes GDP 
growth, or is caused by GDP growth. The distinction is important. If increased 
energy consumption is merely a by-product of growth, it could potentially be 
capped and reduced without dampening economic growth; in other words 
growth and energy consumption could be decoupled. But if increased energy 
consumption is an input to growth, the two cannot be easily decoupled and 
efforts to cap or limit growth of energy consumption may impede economic 
growth.
Detecting the direction of influence between two co-trending variables is done 
using a time series method called vector autoregression (VAR). Econometri-
cians refer to an empirical causality finding as “Granger-causality,” after the 
pioneering econometrician Clive Granger. If knowing the value of one vari-
able x at time t permits more precise forecasts of another variable y at time 
t+1, but not vice-versa, x is said to “Granger-cause” y, since it is a reasona-
ble inference that the direction of influence is only in the one direction. VAR 
analysis has been applied to US data (Stern 2000), Canadian data (Ghali and 
El-Sakka 2004) and others. The results show that energy consumption causes 
economic growth, and in some cases the causality runs both ways. This indi-
cates that energy availability is a constraint on economic growth, rather than 
energy consumption being an unnecessary by-product of economic growth. 
Stern (2000, p. 281) concludes as follows:
 The multivariate analysis shows that energy Granger-causes GDP either 
unidirectionally as indicated by the first of the three models investigated or 
possibly through a mutually causative relationship… The results presented 
in this paper, strengthen my previous conclusions that energy is a limiting 
factor in economic growth. Shocks to energy supply will tend to reduce 
output.
The phrase “energy is a limiting factor in economic growth” is an important 
statement of conclusions. Energy consumption is not merely a by-product that 
can be decoupled from GDP growth. Deliberately reducing energy consump-
tion will likely reduce economic growth, thereby increasing the reluctance of 
policy makers to attempt a reduction. For this reason we need to find out in 
 7
which circumstances policy makers might be tempted to interfere with energy 
consumption. In the 1970s the typical explanation  was a fear of energy shor-
tages. This fear abated as supplies proved ample over the following decades 
and prices stayed low. Now the typical explanation is fear of pollution. So we 
turn to an examination of air emissions. 
3. Energy and Pollution
3.1  three types of air Contaminants
It is helpful to distinguish between three types of air contaminants: direct, 
indirect and CO2. Direct contaminants are emitted to the air by stationary or 
mobile sources in the form in which they persist as contaminants. Examples 
include sulphur dioxide (SO2), nitrogen oxides (NOx), particulate matter (PM), 
and carbon monoxide (CO). Indirect contaminants are formed in the air from 
other compounds. For instance, ground-level ozone (O3) is not emitted direct-
ly, instead it is formed as a chemical reaction under intense ultraviolet light 
involving volatile organic compounds (VOC’s) and NOx, which are themselves 
emitted. Likewise fine particulates, or aerosols, are formed from precursor com-
pounds such as SO2 and NO2. CO2 was not historically considered a pollutant 
because it is not a direct threat to human health. It has only become a focus 
of regulatory interest as an agent involved in climate change.  
3.2  Prospects for decoupling from economic growth
The three types of air contaminants can be distinguished based on the ease 
with which they can be decoupled from economic growth. Briefly, the difficul-
ty ranges from easy for the first type to difficult for CO2. Emissions of direct 
air contaminants like SO2 and particulates have been sharply reduced – to the 
order of 80 - 95% – in western countries despite decades of concurrent growth 
in energy use and output. The availability of scrubbers and other end-of-stack 
emission controls, more efficient fuel burning systems, higher quality fuel sour-
ces and similar technical innovations have been extremely effective in allowing 
western countries to increase their energy use while cutting emissions. 
Plotting U.S. total particulate emissions against real income (Gross Domestic 
Product per capita) over the period 1945–1998 shows the relationship is clearly 
downward-sloping.
8Figure 3.1: U.S. Real GDP per capita and total particulate emissions.
Source: McKitrick (2010 Fig. 1.7) using data from the US Environmental Protection Agency. 
On the other hand, American carbon monoxide (CO) emissions over the same 
interval show an upside-down-U shaped pattern (Fig.1.8).
Figure 3.2: U.S. Real GDP and total carbon monoxide emissions.
Source: McKitrick (2010 Figure 1.8) using data from the US Environmental Protection Agency
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Figure 3.3: U.S. Emissions by type, 1945–1998.
Source: McKitrick (2010 Figure 1.9)
In both cases, it is clear that income and pollution are not positively corre-
lated, and at current income levels are negatively correlated. By the end of 
the 1990s most direct US air contaminant emissions were at or below where 
they were at the end of the Second World War, and in some cases far below, 
as shown in this figure:
The data in Figure 3.3 have been scaled so the 1945 value equals 100 so that 
comparative changes are easy to visualize. NOx grew until about 1975 and 
leveled off thereafter, while all other air pollution emissions fell, and mean-
while real US economic growth continued accelerating. Clearly the decoupling 
of economic growth and conventional, direct air pollution has been proven to 
be technically feasible. 
On the other hand, due to the complexities of the linkage between specific 
emission types and the formation of indirect contaminants, there has been 
less success dealing with ground-level ozone and aerosol pollution. For exa-
mple, the rate of formation of O3 is not a simple linear function. Under some 
circumstances, reductions in NOx emissions may increase ozone formation, 
rather than decrease it (Adamowicz et al. 2001), depending on the level of UV 
light and the abundance of VOCs. O3 only falls if VOCs and NOx are reduced 
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together in the correct proportions. NOx emissions themselves are controlla-
ble, though not as easily or cheaply as SO2 or CO. 
Figure 3.4 shows data from Toronto, Canada, and may be taken as typical for 
many North American urban locations. The monthly average ozone level shows 
strong seasonality, peaking in summer and reaching a minimum in winter, and 
there is relatively little trend over time. 
Figure 3.4: Toronto monthly average ozone concentrations 1974-2003.
Source: McKitrick et al. (2005). Data from Environment Canada NAPS archive. 
However, one feature of the data not apparent in the monthly average readings 
is that the summer ozone spikes have tended to become less intense over time, 
leading to a reduction in local violations of ozone standards in North Ameri-
can cities. Ozone standards in North America are not based on average levels 
over time but on peak levels reached during episodes in which meteorological 
conditions favour rapid ozone and aerosol formation (“smog” episodes). These 
usually occur on hot, muggy days in summer. Figure 3.5 shows the reduction 
in monitoring site violations in US cities from 1975 to 2000. As is clear from 
the data, these events now occur less frequently, even though the average 
ozone level has not declined a great deal. Also note that, by comparison, CO 
violations have fallen much farther, effectively to zero by 2000.
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Figure 3.5: U.S. Air Monitoring Violations per station per year, CO and 
Ozone.
Source: McKitrick (2010) Figure 1.10. 
The third type of contaminant is CO2. In this case, there are no scrubbers, nor are 
emissions reducible simply by increasing the efficiency of the burn. The emis-
sions are strictly determined by the carbon content of the fuel. Consequently, 
CO2 emissions are effectively an index of fossil fuel use, with the carbon/joule 
content highest for coal, next for oil and least for natural gas. While it is pos-
sible to remove the CO2 from a smokestream, it emerges as a gas and cannot 
be disposed of except by pumping it deep underground, which is costly both 
financially and in energy terms, as well as being feasible only in limited loca-
tions. So, in effect, CO2 emissions cannot be decoupled from economic growth 
except by the slow process of  increasing energy efficiency or switching from 
coal to oil or gas for electricity production. Since coal has, historically, been 
the cheapest form of fossil energy for electricity production, as well as the 
easiest to transport and the one most widely available, it has an advantage in 
terms of cost and convenience. Since it is also the most CO2-intensive form 
of fuel, this means that CO2-intensive power generation has a relative cost 
advantage over other forms. Coupled with the absence of scrubber technology 
we understand the reason why attempts to sharply reduce CO2 emissions can 
be expected to have serious economic consequences. 
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4. The Energy Mix
4.1  Price and Production trends
The reason for the long term position of coal as a leading energy source is 
shown by the following chart, which tracks real energy prices from 1949 to 
2010. Coal is not only the cheapest energy source, but has the least price vo-
latility. Natural gas remains relatively expensive even after its recent large 
drop in price.
Figure 4.1: Real fossil energy process, 1949-2010. (1949=100). 
Source: http://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/annual/index.cfm#financial.
On the production side, fossil sources continue to dominate electricity produc-
tion, as shown in Figure 4.2. In 1973, 86.6% of world energy came from coal, 
oil and natural gas. In 2009 these sources contributed 80.9%, with nuclear 
now providing 5.8%. The share attributable to biofuels, waste, geothermal and 
other renewables went from 10.7% to 11%, in other words, it hardly changed. 
Even in countries that engaged in significant policy effort to increase use of 
renewables, they did not gain much market share. American data are shown in 
Figure 4.3. Up to around 2006 renewables remained at or below 5% while coal 
grew steadily to just over 30%, after having fallen from 40% to about 20% 
in the 1950s and 60s. After 2006, heavy policy intervention led to renewables 
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growing from 5% to 7%, displacing some coal and nuclear, while natural gas 
grew from 30% to 33%. 
Figure 4.2: World energy production by fuel source. 
Source:  http://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/key_world_energy_
stats-1.pdf. 
Fossil sources (coal, gas and oil) accounted for 91% of US energy in 1949, and 
78% in 2010. Most of the difference was made up by the introduction of nucle-
ar, which now provides just over 10% of US energy. The continued dominance 
of fossil sources, and the failure of renewables to advance, are an indication 
that there are considerable technical and economic obstacles to their use. The 
economic obstacles are indicated by the fact that they only advance when sub-
sidies are offered, and they decline when the subsidies are removed.1
1 See, for instance, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/print/2012-05-29/spain-ejects-clean-
power-industry-with-europe-precedent-energy.html. 
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Figure 4.3: US Energy production by fuel source. 
Source: http://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/annual/index.cfm#summary. 
5. Economic principles
5.1  using the price system
Ignoring pollution externalities and natural monopolies for a moment, if we 
ask what would be the best way to organize a country’s electricity generation 
system, economists will typically turn to the price system to find the best way 
to proceed. The price system does not dictate how the energy will be provi-
ded, it only provides a mechanism for the market to do the job in the most 
efficient way possible. 
On the supply side, investors need to make long term commitments to a phy-
sical capital stock and accompanying fuel sources. The price system naturally 
encourages the processing of large amounts of information necessary to find 
and select the options that minimize the long term cost of production, given 
the relative endowments of resources available in each location. The result is 
a supply schedule that presents consumers with electricity quantities and their 
corresponding unit prices. If the supply system is competitive, these prices will 
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converge on the marginal value to society of the resources used to provide the 
electricity. Then consumers can make decisions about how much electricity to 
use, presumably on the basis that the value they derive from each kilowatt of 
consumption exceeds the cost of purchasing it. 
This is standard microeconomic reasoning, and applies to any energy market, 
including fuels. The point to be emphasized is that there is nothing special 
about electricity. The price system provides incentives for efficient supply and 
demand decisions without the need for a central coordinator. However, two 
issues can arise that require modifications to the market structure. First, be-
cause electricity generation can involve large capital expenses there is a risk 
of natural monopolies forming. If one envisions a situation in which a market 
is small relative to the size of any power source, the first operator to enter the 
market can achieve economies of scale so quickly that any potential entrant 
must do so at higher supply costs than the incumbent. In this case no firm will 
be able to contest the market and a monopoly will result. The incumbent firm 
can then over-charge consumers, setting the price up above the competitive 
rate but just below the rate that would attract competitors. This issue is of-
ten presented in textbooks, but in practice is not a great concern. If a single 
monopolist emerges, it is relatively straightforward to implement price regu-
lations to limit its power to overcharge consumers. Moreover, technology is 
such that continental electricity markets have formed in which suppliers must 
compete with each other to an extent sufficient to alleviate concerns about 
natural monopolies. If supply monopolies exist today it is likely that they are 
the result of government policy, not the rationale for them. 
Second, and more relevant to this discussion, some power generating sources 
generate external effects in the form of air emissions. The question then beco-
mes, how should policy makers intervene in the power sector to address this? 
The next section will examine this more closely using microeconomic reaso-
ning, but the key concept can be stated simply as the principle of targeting. 
Whatever the matter for regulatory concern, efficiency is aided by targeting 
the intervention on the specific issue itself, rather than on secondary issues or 
matters only partly connected to it. If the issue of concern is the sulphur coming 
out of a smokestack, implement policies that regulate the sulphur coming out 
of the smokestack. Do not implement policies that tell customers hundreds of 
miles away from the smokestack how they should boil their eggs, in the hopes 
that this will affect how much electricity they use and, eventually, how much 
sulphur comes out of the smokestack. Any reductions in sulphur emissions 
achieved by rules about how people hundreds of miles away should boil their 
eggs will be achieved with far greater cost and inconvenience to industry and 
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the public than a rule directly limiting sulphur emissions. It would be more ef-
fective and efficient simply to regulate the sulphur emissions themselves and 
leave the remaining decisions about electricity supply and demand to market 
participants. The idea, once grasped, is intuitively obvious, yet modern envi-
ronmental policymaking seems to have completely missed it, as evidenced by 
the proliferation of rules about appliance standards, light bulbs, windmills, 
etc., all of which are done in the name of controlling emissions coming out 
of power plant stacks. 
5.2  taking into account externalities
5.2.1 Emission pricing
No conceptual difficulties emerge when incorporating pollution externalities 
into the standard microeconomic model of the market. At the theoretical level 
it is possible to solve the equations describing a welfare-maximizing competi-
tive market outcome in the presence of pollution externalities.2 It is a serious 
mistake to suppose that the mere existence of externalities renders the eco-
nomic approach to energy markets invalid—far from it. The economic model 
handles externalities quite readily and provides sound guidance relating to the 
reasons for current policy difficulties. 
If external costs were dealt with using price instruments, the basic insight of 
the Sandmo analysis is that, rather than subsidizing indirect control measures 
or regulating quantities in related markets, emitters should pay a fee per unit 
of emissions that reflects the marginal social cost of their actions. This is an 
old idea, traditionally attributed to Pigou in the 1920s, but the Sandmo ana-
lysis allows us to draw more detailed conclusions. 
First, the optimal policy applies to the emissions themselves, and nothing else. 
Any additional price or regulatory intervention must, by necessity, make it cost- 
lier to achieve the same outcome. This goes against the instinct of policyma-
kers, who often want a “portfolio” of measures to deal with what sounds like 
a complex issue. In the case of greenhouse gases, since so many sectors of the 
economy are involved, and the industrial processes are often very complex, 
policymakers have apparently taken the view that many different complex 
rules and procedures are needed. But this is a fallacy, and reflects a confusion 
in thinking. Despite the number of economic sectors and complex activities 
2 Sandmo (1975) is the standard reference on this. My textbook (McKitrick 2010, chapter 8) 
provides a detailed derivation and explanation of Sandmo’s result. 
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involved in greenhouse gas emissions, only one price instrument is needed, 
namely a price on CO2. The rest can follow from decentralized decision-making 
without the need for central economic planning.  
Second, the optimal policy should take the form of a price on emissions set 
somewhat below the estimated marginal damages, with the reduction propor-
tional to the inverse of the marginal cost of public funds. The reason for this 
condition has to do with the distortions created elsewhere in the economy by 
the necessity of funding the government using a tax system, which inflates the 
cost of providing public goods, including pollution control. If the funds raised 
by a carbon tax are treated in a revenue-neutral way, namely to pay for re-
ductions in other taxes, and the carbon tax is scaled to take into account the 
overall distortionary burden of the rest of the tax system, then the resulting 
emissions level will reflect the optimal tradeoff between costs and benefits of 
pollution control and the emission reductions will have been achieved at the 
minimum cost to society. 
5.2.2 Pricing versus quantity targets
The integration of pollution control into general optimal policy making can be 
achieved naturally in a framework in which the policy targets the emissions 
price, rather than the quantity. In other words, economists have worked through 
the optimal conditions for pollution policy by thinking in terms of emission 
fees (prices), rather than emission standards (quantities). This is partly for 
convenience, since the math is easier when working in terms of prices rather 
than quantities. But there are deeper reasons for favouring price instruments 
even when it is possible to devise a policy intervention that targets quantities. 
Only in very simplistic frameworks is there a symmetry between regulating 
price and regulating quantity. Some policy analysts mistakenly assume that 
the two are always interchangeable. In the carbon policy world this means 
that policymakers are sometimes told that it makes no difference whether they 
opt for a carbon tax or a tradable permit (cap-and-trade) system. But this is 
incorrect for two reasons. 
First, pricing instruments raise revenue by capturing all the scarcity rents. Any 
policy that limits a valuable activity (such as by imposing emission reductions) 
creates gaps between the cost of providing a good or service and the return 
on it at the regulated margin. These gaps create windfall gains, or “rents” as 
economists call them. A good example is the taxi industry. Cities issue a li-
mited number of licenses for taxis, and in most cases the number of licenses, 
and hence competitors, is limited to such an extent that taxis can charge more 
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than the actual cost of providing the service. Knowing that these rents are 
created by the licensing policy, buyers are willing to pay considerable sums to 
get a taxi license. The license itself costs nothing for the regulator to create, 
so the value of the license represents the capitalization of the expected rental 
flows. It is not new wealth, however, instead it is a transfer from households 
to license owners, and the rents transferred are always smaller than the ad-
ditional costs created by the license system. The difference is referred to as 
the deadweight loss. 
Caps on emissions also create rents, but they are hidden in layers of economic 
activity and accrue to industries and investors in ways that can be difficult to 
predict. Just as with taxi rents, they are not new wealth, instead they represent 
transfers of wealth from consumers to producers. If the regulator uses cap-
and-trade, issuing permits and then allowing firms to trade them, the value 
of these rents becomes visible as firms bid for the permits. 
For instance, if a regulator issues permits for 100 megatonnes of carbon emis-
sions, and they trade on the market for $20 each, the total capitalized value 
of the rents created by the policy is therefore 20 x 100 million = $2 billion. The 
total cost of the policy to households is therefore $2 billion plus the actual 
cost of emissions abatement – which will be passed onto households through 
higher prices and reduced rates of return for labour and capital – as well as 
the second-order distortions resulting from applying the existing tax system 
to markets where prices are now higher and quantities are lower. Emission 
fees capture the $2 billion for the public purse. If this is treated as new re-
venue then households are no better off. But if the revenue is used to fund 
reductions in other taxes, then the social cost of the policy drops by $2 billion 
plus the value of the reduced excess burdens of the tax system. It is possible 
to capture the rents from tradable permits by auctioning them rather than 
giving them away free, but this practice has been rare. It is not possible to 
capture the rents under a system of regulatory standards. Hence quantity and 
price controls are not symmetric in their overall macroeconomic costs, since 
quantity controls typically fail to capture the rents created by the policy and 
this adds to the costs to households. 
Second, the symmetry between price and quantity breaks down when there 
is uncertainty. A regulator can target the emissions price, and let the market 
determine the resulting quantity, or he/she can target the emissions quantity, 
and let the market determine the price, but he/she cannot determine both. The 
“price” of emissions corresponds to the marginal cost of emission reductions, 
or the marginal abatement cost. Having targeted the quantity of emissions, 
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the market will determine the marginal abatement cost (MAC). If the regulator 
intends to target the marginal cost, the market will determine the resulting 
quantity of emissions.
Figure 5.1.: Price regulation versus quantity regulation 
Source: Taken from McKitrick 2012, fig. 4
Figure 5.1 illustrates what this means. The horizontal axis shows the quanti-
ty of emissions and the vertical axis shows the marginal abatement cost. As 
emissions go down, the cost of each further unit of emission reductions goes 
up, which is why the line slopes up as you read it from right to left. There are 
two firms. Firm A has a relatively shallow MAC line and firm B has a relatively 
steep one, meaning that it is relatively more expensive for firm B to cut emis-
sions than for firm A. Now suppose the regulator orders each emitter to red-
uce emissions to the level E1. For emitter A this implies that the last unit of 
emission abatement costs $25, while for emitter B it costs $100. Now suppose 
the regulator did not intend emitters to pay more than $25 per unit to reduce 
emissions. By imposing a target on the emissions quantity axis (namely E1), 
the regulator forces the marginal costs to go above the intended level. 
20
If the regulator instead imposed an emission fee of $25 per unit, both firms 
would cut emissions, since, over a limited interval, they save more in taxes by 
doing so than they incur in abatement costs. The point each firm would aim 
for is where their MAC line crosses the tax rate. Thus firm B will not reach the 
emissions level E1; it will reduce emissions only to the level E2. Below this 
point the firm’s marginal abatement costs are above the cut-off. 
The regulator cannot cap the marginal cost at $25 while asking both firms to 
cut emissions to E1. There is an inverse relation between the marginal cost cut-
off and the volume of emission reductions that can be achieved. The higher the 
acceptable marginal cost of abatement, the lower the resulting emissions level 
will be. The lower the acceptable marginal cost, the higher the resulting emis-
sions level will be. In this way the marginal abatement cost curve resembles a 
demand curve, since it shows the emissions level at each marginal cost level.
What happens if a regulator only intends for firms to incur a maximum cost of, 
say, $25 per tonne for abatement, but imposes a target that implies a margi-
nal cost of, say $100 per tonne? Figure 5 shows that the result for firm B is a 
gap between the intended ($25) and the actual ($100) marginal cost. The size 
of this gap is a measure of the uncertainty cost arising from the policymaking 
error. Would it have been better for the policymaker to set a price target in-
stead of a quantity target? The answer depends on two things.
First, if there are known danger thresholds associated with emissions, the 
regulator may decide that a quantity target is necessary, regardless of the 
costs. This may be the case with highly toxic local emissions, for instance. It 
is unlikely to be the case with general air pollutants that mix over large areas 
since emissions from any one source have relatively small effects on the ove-
rall concentration. In the case of carbon dioxide, since marginal damages of 
emissions do not change over the entire range of a country’s emissions, this 
consideration does not apply. 
Second, if the marginal abatement cost curve is relatively steep, it is more 
likely that targeting an emissions quantity will lead to relatively larger uncer-
tainty errors than would an emissions price target. The steeper  firm B’s MAC 
in figure 5, the larger the gap will be between the intended and the actual 
marginal cost of emission reduction. 
Since there are no scrubbers and no inexpensive abatement options, the mar-
ginal cost of reducing CO
2 emissions rises quickly. Attempting to pick a target 
on the quantity axis guarantees large swings and errors on the price axis. But 
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for the same reason, when the MAC is steep, picking pretty much any emis-
sions price will tend to yield only small errors in the resulting emissions level. 
Economists have shown that using price-based emission reduction policies for 
globally-mixed pollutants with steep MAC’s – which describes the CO2 case—
leads to lower uncertainty costs, or in other words lower costs associated with 
errors in choosing the right level of policy intervention. 
In practice it is much more common for regulators to target the emission quan-
tity than the emissions price, or marginal cost. But this is only due to habit, 
and in reality there is always an implied emissions price. If the regulator picks 
a target like E1 and insists that it be enforced, this implies the marginal cost 
cut-off is at least $100; in other words we are willing to force emitters to 
incur costs of $100 per tonne in order to reduce emissions.
It is important to recognize that the “success” of a price-based instrument 
is not measured by whether the emission reductions achieve some arbitrary 
quantity target. In Figure 5, it is not the case that a $25 tax is “successful” in 
reducing firm A’s emissions but “unsuccessful” at reducing firm B’s emissions. 
The tax was successful at reducing each firm’s emissions up to the point where 
further emission reductions would be inefficient. The fact that Firm B undertook 
relatively little abatement is not a failure, it is the efficient outcome.  
5.3  the pricing principle
Even if, for some reason, a policymaker insists on regulating the quantity of 
emissions rather than the price, the analysis herein can still provide guidance 
on how it should be done. Emission pricing works in practice, but it also works 
in theory. So at a simple level we can conduct an economic thought experi-
ment along the following lines. Suppose we are concerned about particulate 
emissions from power plants. In line with the principle of targeting a per-tonne 
price is placed directly on particulate emissions. How would emitters respond? 
Analysts familiar with the power sector can likely offer some reasonable spe-
culations. Some firms will have older plants that they simply close down and 
replace with newer more efficient units. Some will install scrubbers and other 
end-of-pipe treatment. Some will find all their options too expensive and will 
just pay the tax instead. Once these responses have been initiated, the price 
of electricity from power plants would probably go up slightly. Other firms 
might then look at whether nuclear, wind or solar energy is now cheaper to 
provide than coal-powered electricity. From the North American experience 
the answer is probably not. We can see from Figure 3.3 that US particulate 
emissions (PM10) had already fallen 50% by 1975 before nuclear power beca-
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me a major energy source, and nuclear required heavy government subsidies 
to make it viable. Particulates had fallen close to 90% by 2005, after which 
wind energy began to grow only because it was pushed by government policy. 
So even after incurring the costs of heavy PM10 reductions, the private sector 
was still reluctant to invest in nuclear and wind sources without government 
subsidies. This means that even after pricing in pollution control for conventi-
onal sources, it remains relatively inexpensive compared to alternative energy 
sources, so the production sector would not respond to an emissions tax by, 
for instance, building windmills.
Likewise, we can ask how households would respond to the slight increase in 
electricity cost once a tax on particulate emissions was implemented. Chances 
are most would make only slight behavioral changes, such as reducing power 
consumption a little bit. There might be a few changes at the margin in ap-
pliance and light fixture choices, but it is unlikely households would make an 
extreme switch towards one type of lightbulb, for instance. 
If the regulator wants to use quantity controls rather than pricing instru-
ments, the pricing principle states that the best way to do so is to figure out 
how firms would have responded to a price, and then aim for that outcome in 
the quantity space. So in our thought experiment, concerns about particulate 
emissions would mainly lead to adoption of scrubbers and accelerated turnover 
of old plants, but not to investment in wind energy or complete rejection of 
existing household appliances and light bulbs. The contrast with actual expe-
rience then becomes evident. Regulators concerned about air pollution have 
required installation of scrubbers but also offer lavish subsidies for wind and 
solar energy and have issued bans and directives on various household appli-
ances. These are wasteful and unjustified. 
In the same way, we can ask how firms would respond to a levy on carbon 
dioxide emissions? Many power generating firms would simply pay it and only 
slightly adjust their fuel consumption, because of the steepness of their mar-
ginal abatement cost curves. Others would act more aggressively, perhaps by 
replacing coal plants with natural gas ones. But under any reasonable car-
bon price it is unlikely German power producers would have invested much, 
if anything, in solar farms or wind turbines. Hence the push to develop these 
industries is not justified as a CO
2 emissions policy, since a policy targeted on 
efficient control of emissions would not have led to them being developed. 
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6. Concluding remarks
Growth in energy consumption is not just a by-product of economic growth, 
it is a causal factor. Attempts to constrain energy consumption can therefore 
be expected to impede economic growth. Fossil-based energy, especially coal, 
has a stable long-term economic advantage as a fuel source. Concerns about 
pollution have led to considerable policy intervention in the energy sector 
over the past decade, but much of it has been based on misunderstandings of 
the relevant pollution issues. Conventional air pollution is not a necessary by-
product of power production and has been successfully decoupled from it in 
western countries through development of scrubbers and other end-of-pipe 
treatments. Indirect air contaminants, such as ozone and aerosols, are not tren-
ding upwards and peak level episodes have fallen, but the complexities of the 
atmospheric processes in these cases make progress inherently slower. Carbon 
dioxide is not controllable by conventional scrubbers, instead it is tied linearly 
to energy consumption. CO2 emission reductions will therefore be much more 
expensive to achieve under current technology. 
Economic reasoning has led to a few basic ideas for guiding energy and pollu-
tion policy. The principle of targeting states that regulations should be focused 
directly on the variable of interest. If we are concerned about air pollution 
coming from power plant smokestacks, then we should regulate the emissions 
coming from the smokestacks, not kitchen appliances in households hundreds 
of miles away who buy their electricity from the power plant. The principle 
of pricing states that the most efficient outcome of well-designed regulati-
ons will match that which would have resulted from using price instruments 
directly applied to the emissions of concern. In practice, achieving that out-
come is easiest simply by using price instruments. But if this is not feasible, 
the pricing principle can still be used as an analytic tool to understand why 
some interventions, like the subsidy-driven expansion of the renewables sec-
tor, is inefficient. 
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